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inevitable unless Japan and the United States are prepared to do their share in the defence of our common interests against a danger which threatens us all equally.
You should so inform the Government of Tokyo/Washington. You should add that we are advised that the commandants estimate of 25,000 is reasonable, that we are prepared to contribute to it a force of
if Japan and the United States are prepared to supply the balance, and you should ask for a very early declaration of their intentions in order that we may at once issue the necessary instructions whether for reinforcement or evacuation.
APPENDIX (B).
Decypher telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Peking), No. 634, dated April 7, 1927.
(Immediate.)
:
I AM somewhat perturbed by your telegram No. 237 of 5th April (evacuation of Peking and Tien-tsin), and although time presses I feel that before issuing any warning or making any announcement to my foreign colleagues in the sense thereof it is necessary to have a clear understanding regarding our general policy in China. In my telegram No. 540 of 28th March I outlined various courses which seemed to be open to us, but it will be best perhaps if I restate the position as I understand it I assume desired object of His Majesty's Government, if circumstances permit, is a settlement by agreement with both South and North until such time as it may be possible to make a general agreement with a united China. But I assume Nanking has interrupted this policy, which, in so far as it concerns the South, is bound to remain suspended (a) so long as Nanking is unexpiated, and (b) so long as there is real danger of repetitions of Nanking, i.e., so long as the South are unable to show that they are a responsible Government actuated by bona fide good intention. If South make it impossible for us to resume our policy of conciliation the choice has hitherto seemed to me to lie between (1) coercion of the South; (2) total abandonment of our own interests in China or in whatever part of China Southern party holds; or (3) concentration of British nationals in the three cardinal points of Shanghai, Tien-tsin and Canton, there to await developments indefinitely.
The first of these alternatives is, I take it, ruled out. It is regarding second and third that I am in doubt and that I beg for enlightenment as to policy of His Majesty's Government. I understood that His Majesty's Government, when they sent out defence force to Shanghai, had set their face against total abandonment of China, and I shared the impression, which I am sure is general out here, that they had decided to stand independently, if necessary, on the three vital centres Shanghai, Tien-tsin and Canton. From your telegram under reply, this impression seems to have been mistaken, and I therefore feel constrained to ask, for my guidance in dealing with rapidly changing circumstances, for a definite pronouncement from His Majesty's Government as to maximum extent to which they are prepared to defend British interests in China. In other words, do they contemplate complete abandon- ment, and, if not, what is the limit of policy of evacuation?
I note that your telegram under reference emphasises the fact that we are not prepared to defend Peking and Tien-tsin alone. Am I right in presuming that His Majesty's Government are still prepared to undertake defence of both places and to keep open communication between them if other Powers will co-operate? I feel it necessary that I should know mind of His Majesty's Government definitely on this point before I make any announcement to my colleagues. In any case, whether we are prepared for joint defence measures or whether we decide definitely to evacuate, I feel that we owe it to other Powers first to discuss matters with them and endeavour to agree upon joint action.
I should be glad to be assured also that decision to evacuate Tien-tsin in certain circumstances has not been decided on purely military grounds but after full weight has been given to possible political and economic consequences. Politically it is obvious that mere knowledge of our intention to go will have the worst effect on Chang Tso-lin and on his prospects and will correspondingly strengthen and encourage Southern cause. Economically, of course, it will have far-reaching effect on British China trade in general, and will, I fear, arouse storm of protest among British interests in China, since Tien-tsin is second largest and second most important British community here, and it is unlikely that, once gone, we shall ever
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